

Executive Psychiatry

9-3134

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Washington, D. C.

2 MAY 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Harold E. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT : Reply to Action Assignment

1. The Army Task Force, in compliance with your request made at the March 1st meeting of Task Forces, has considered whether a previously agreed reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments could be implemented concurrently with the installation of an inspection system, generally as proposed in the document "Comprehensive Inspection Plan", dated January 20, 1956.

2. We believe that a reduction such as now being considered at the London Disarmament Conference can be integrated with the progressive installation of an inspection system. Detailed plans for the establishment of an inspection system under such a concept should be developed by technical representatives of the respective Participating States.

3. Our conclusions and recommendations, along with a suggested outline of a schedule for the integration of an armed forces/armament reduction with the installation of an inspection system, are included as Inclosure 1.

SIGNEE

Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.
General, U.S. Army (Retired)
Acting Task Force Chairman

Inclosure - 1

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CONCLUSIONS

1. It is considered that,

a. The "Comprehensive Inspection Plan", dated January 20, 1936, as well as the Department of Defense (JCS) "Draft Plan for a Comprehensive Armament and Armed Force Inspection System",

(1) provides for the progressive installation of an armed forces and armaments inspection system by means of the gradual application of stages of disclosure and verification through a series of step-by-step intensifications of the system, and

(2) may be readily adapted to include the added objective of providing surveillance to insure that agreed armed forces and armaments limitations are carried out and maintained.

b. Restriction of an aerial and ground inspection system to a specified geographical area, while seemingly offering the best chance of acceptance by the USSR and presenting some safeguards against surprise attack, does not completely fulfill the requirement for surveillance of reduction. This deficiency might be overcome by authorizing a limited number of ground inspection teams to have unimpeded access to the national territory of Participating States for the specific purpose of checking compliance with the reduction agreement.

c. In event agreed reductions are initiated concurrently with the actual installation of the inspection system, Participating States should be required to place armaments in excess of agreed first-stage authorizations in a condition of operational storage subject to unrestricted surveillance, pending final disposition.

d. A possible method of determining the quantities of conventional armament to be retained for the authorized 2.5 million manpower limitation is through application of the international slice system proposed by the UK. It is anticipated, however, that agreement on the application of this or any other method will be difficult to obtain.

e. The Western Power countries appear to be in general agreement concerning the objective, composition and requirement for a comprehensive inspection system. There is, however, no one plan which represents the integrated views of all countries.

f. A schedule could be developed for the integration of a manpower/armament reduction with the progressive installation of a comprehensive inspection system. A suggested broad outline for such a schedule, basically a composite of previous proposals, is at Appendix A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. It is recommended that,

a. The Department of Defense, as the probable U.S. executive agent for the operation of the inspection system, provide technical representation for the United States in the development of any inspection plans.

b. Any inspection plan for the purpose of providing (1) safeguards against surprise attack and (2) surveillance of manpower/armament reductions be in consonance with the principles contained in the "Comprehensive Inspection Plan", dated 20 January 1956, the Department of Defense (JCS) "Draft Plan for a Comprehensive Armament and Armed Force Inspection System", and the views expressed in paragraph 1. above.

c. Technical representatives of the Western Powers prepare a detailed plan for integrating an agreed conventional manpower/armament reduction into a comprehensive inspection system so that a united position may be presented to the USSR in future discussions. Such a plan should include provisions for,

(1) Safeguards against surprise attack,

(2) Surveillance of agreed conventional manpower/armaments reduction, and,

(3) Checks to insure that future production of fissionable materials will be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes.

d. Following the preparation of a plan acceptable to the Western Powers, technical representatives from all Participating States convene for the purpose of preparing a mutually acceptable comprehensive inspection plan which includes the above mentioned provisions.

List of Appendices
Appendix "A"

APPENDIX A TO INCLOSURE 1

AN OUTLINE OF A SCHEDULE
for the
INTEGRATION OF THE INSTALLATION OF AN INSPECTION SYSTEM
with
A PLAN FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT REDUCTION

PHASE I (ORGANIZATIONAL)

1. This is primarily an organizational phase to include the following:

a. Establishment of the previously agreed supervisory organization structure required to implement the Armaments Control Plan.

b. An Executive Committee, consisting of representatives of the Participating States, will finalize an inspection plan which in addition to providing safeguards against surprise attack will include surveillance to insure that armament and armed force limitations are carried out and maintained.

c. Upon agreement to an effective inspection system each Participating State will submit to the Executive Committee a complete set of military blueprints, including among other things,

(1) The military strength in manpower and armaments existing when the reduction begins, and as it will exist in accordance with the reduction schedule.

(2) Information concerning how the manpower and armaments reduction is to be accomplished -- in sufficient detail to facilitate checking and surveillance by the inspecting organization which will include ground and aerial elements.

(3) Disposition of excess armaments including the schedule for placement in operational storage.

2. When the Executive Committee determines that Phase I has been completed satisfactorily, the earliest possible date for the beginning of Phase II will be determined.

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- NOTE:** (1) The Actions proposed in the organizational phase are essentially those listed in JCS document "A Method of Determining Levels of Armament Under a Comprehensive Disarmament System", dated 30 October 1956.
- (2) For the purpose of the report, conventional armaments are any weapons or weapon systems not possessing a nuclear or therma-nuclear delivery capability.

SECRETPHASE II (1 year)

Progressive Installation of the Inspection System	Disclosures and Verification of the Military Blueprint	Armaments and Armed Forces Reduction
<u>STEP 1 (3 months)</u>		
Establish administrative framework of the organiza- tion, e.g., Directing Hqrs, District Hqrs, select observer post sites and pre- pare abbreviated communica- tion network. <u>Do not staff for inspection operations.</u>	None	None
<u>STEP 2 (9 months)</u>		
Staff and operate installa- tions listed in Step 1, including verification & inspection teams per District Hqrs. as agreed.	Exercise ground and air surveillance to insure that a. Scheduled personnel and armament reductions are actually made and maintained. b. Existing armed forces do not attempt a surprise attack.	Reduce on a monthly pro-rata basis a. Agreed personnel quota for Phase II b. And place in opera- tional storage as declared in the military blueprints the agreed quota of each type of conven- tional arms.
<u>PHASE III</u>		
Intensify the inspection organization through estab- lishment of intermediate headquarters and increasing the number of observer teams as required.	Carry out surveillance generally as in Phase II but on an enlarged scale.	Reduce on a monthly pro-rata basis a. Agreed personnel quota for Phase III b. And place in opera- tional storage as declared in the military blueprints the agreed quota of conventional arms.

Note: (1) The Executive Committee, after determining that preceding steps and/or Phases have been satisfactorily completed, will authorize the next Step or Phase.

(2) In event Phase II is restricted geographically, entry into Phase III could be contingent upon expansion of the system into additional areas.